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Few areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence have provoked as much
commentary as the Court's decisions under the "establishment of religion"
clause of the First Amendment.1 One increasingly influential school of
thought critical of the Court's establishment clause doctrine argues that
the establishment clause is the complement of the free exercise
clause 2-that the establishment clause, like the free exercise clause, is a
guarantee of religious liberty; that the establishment clause, like the free
exercise clause, should focus on governmental coercion affecting religious
choice.3
This view is promising: it makes more sense of the text, history, and
current doctrine (to the extent salvageable) of the establishment clause
than any other offered so far. But it also presents troubling implications.
What does the establishment clause provide that the free exercise clause
does not, if a claim can be conceptualized under either clause? Does this
view, in its attempt to reconcile and harmonize the two clauses, improp-
erly collapse them into each other?"
One possible answer is that the two clauses should essentially be treated
as one.5 But another answer is that the establishment clause, functionally,
is a "public law" analogue to the free exercise clause-a "class action"
version of the free exercise clause. This Note suggests that courts should
analogize the establishment clause to a "class action" aggregation of free
exercise claims in its protection of religious liberty. Because individual
religious liberty interests are generally smaller in establishment clause
cases than in free exercise cases, the establishment clause protects free
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONsT. amend. I,
cl. 1.
2. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST.
amend. I, cl. 2.
3. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1 [hereinafter McConnell,
Accommodation]; McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 933 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Coercion]; Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitu-
tion: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 311 (1986).
4. See G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TusHNEr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 188
(Supp. 1988).
5. See Paulsen, supra note 3 (suggesting that establishment clause requires "equal protection" of
the free exercise of religion).
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exercise interests that tend to be undervindicated by the use of a simple
bipolar litigation model, where the incentive for any individual to bring
suit is diminished. On the other hand, establishment clause claims, as cur-
rently adjudicated, tend to overstate the extent of the constitutional viola-
tion and resulting harm. The relief granted tends to be broader than nec-
essary to remedy the injury suffered, violating the principle that the scope
of the remedy must be narrowly tailored to the nature and extent of the
constitutional violation.6
This Note examines the possibility of reconceptualizing establishment
clause cases as class action aggregations of free exercise interests. Section I
briefly discusses the origins and shortcomings of the Court's existing es-
tablishment clause jurisprudence, and argues for an analysis that focuses
upon religious liberty. Section II describes a possible free exercise-class
action approach based upon the coercion of religious choice created by a
challenged government action. Section III examines the implications of
this mode of analysis, with particular regard to standing to sue and reme-
dial possibilities.
I. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS PROBLEMS
Since the establishment clause was first applied to the states in 1947,7
the Supreme Court has struggled to give meaning to that provision within
the twentieth century context. The Court has from the outset of this en-
terprise relied upon the historical foundations of the clause to guide its
interpretations.8 In Everson, the Court relied on the writings of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison as interpretive aids in concluding that the
clause creates, in Jefferson's phrase, "a wall of separation between church
and State;" 9 this reading of history formed the basis of the Court's early
establishment clause decisions."0
6. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982);
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977).
7. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state provision of bus transportation
for parochial and non-parochial school students).
8. See Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 8-16; id. at 33 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) (historical acceptance of creche displays); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983) (historical acceptance of legislative invocations).
9. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson to Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Ass'n (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
281-82 (A. Bergh ed. 1907)).
10. This Note's utilization of historical arguments is in response to the Supreme Court's percep-
tion that the meaning of the establishment clause is singularly discernible in that clause's unique
history. Space limitations prevent a thorough discussion here of methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Suffice it to say that this Note's methodology is "interpretivist" in that it accords constitutional
text, structure, and history a guiding role in interpretation while rejecting the claim that the specific
"original intentions" of the Framers are clear as a matter of history and binding as a matter of
constitutional law. See generally Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 695 (1987)
("Our distance from the founders makes translation necessary; what we have in common with them
makes translation worthwhile.").
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A. Historical and Doctrinal Difficulties
Numerous critics have argued that the Court's initial historical analysis
was severely flawed.11 As it has become evident that the historical founda-
tions of the clause are more complex than the Court's historical account
suggests, the Court has shifted from historical analysis to doctrinal devel-
opment,12 ultimately summarizing this development in a three part test
announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman:3 the challenged state action must
have a legitimate secular purpose, its primary effect must be neither to
advance nor to inhibit religion, and it must not create excessive entangle-
ment between the state and religious entities.
14
The Supreme Court's characterization of the history and meaning of
the establishment clause has been a source of significant controversy.
5
The Court's doctrinal approach to the establishment clause has been sub-
ject to criticism on two main grounds. First, it has created an unnatural
tension between the establishment clause and the free exercise clause.' 6
The Justices have found that an accommodation of religion required by
the free exercise clause may be, when enacted into law, an impermissible
violation of the establishment clause."i When it has acknowledged this
11. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982);
M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (1978); McConnell, Coercion, supra note 3; Smith, Getting Off On the Wrong Foot and Back
On Again: A Reexamination of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and a Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569
(1984); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 125-26 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("the historical
purposes of the religious clauses of the First Amendment are significantly more obscure and complex
than this Court has heretofore acknowledged."); Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, 27 Whi. & MARY L. REV. 839, 841-42 (1986) ("History should provide the perimeters
within which the choice of meaning may be made. History ordinarily should not be expected, how-
ever, to provide specific answers to the specific problems that bedevil the Court.").
12. While the Supreme Court has shifted from relying upon history to relying upon doctrine and
precedent, the Court has based its doctrinal development upon precedents that were themselves justi-
fied on the basis of the Court's reading of history. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 3, at 934
("Essentially, what once was declared necessary because of history now is declared necessary because
of precedent.").
13. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
14. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Court has indicated an unwillingness to be confined to this
single test, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984); Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971), and has not
uniformly applied the test, see Lynch, 465 U.S. 668 (historical test for creche display); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (historical test for legislative prayer); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228 (1982) (strict scrutiny test for regulation alleged to discriminate among religious organizations).
15. See Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 83, 97-98.
16. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-1, at 1154 (2d ed. 1988);
Nichol, Introduction: Religion and the State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 833, 835-36 (1986); Pfeffer,
Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 561 (1980); Symposium: The Tension Between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 289, 289-499 (1986).
17. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to Sev-
enth Day Adventist due to refusal to accept employment requiring Saturday work impermissibly bur-
dens free exercise) with Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (state law protecting
workers from dismissal for refusing to work on chosen Sabbath impermissibly advances religion); see
also McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3.
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tension, the Court has portrayed it as inherent in the two clauses and not
as the product of errant constructions of them."8 Second, the Court, recog-
nizing the dissonance between its doctrine and the textual and historical
background of the clause, has at times declined to apply the Lemon test,' 9
or has been less than rigorous in its application.20 The Court's holdings
under its establishment clause doctrine therefore have struck many observ-
ers as inconsistent and unprincipled.2 The Court itself admits that the
Lemon test "sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility;"2 2 this
seems to some a tacit admission that the Court's actual approach to an
establishment clause violation is one of "we know it when we see it."23
B. The Lost Element of Establishment
In 1789, the framers of the First Amendment were concerned primarily
with limiting the power of the new Federal government with regard to
religion in the states.2 4 This dimension has been undermined by the incor-
18. "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of
which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). This "neutral course" has
struck one dissenter as one "narrow[ing] the channel between the Scylla and Charybdis ..
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 721 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (applying historical test, rather than
Lemon test, to evaluate legislative prayer).
20. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (municipally-sponsored nativity scene does
not violate establishment clause).
21. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 680-81 (1980); Marshall,
Unprecedential Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 925, 926 (1986); Paulsen,
supra note 3, at 315-17.
22. Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). The Lemon test has come
under criticism from four members of the Court, see Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 613-19 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
but it remains the standard, see Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (1988).
23. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It". The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S.
CAL. L. REv. 495 (1986).
24.
As a matter of history, the First Amendment was adopted solely as a limitation upon the
newly created National Government. The events leading to its adoption strongly suggest that
the Establishment Clause was primarily an attempt to insure that Congress not only would be
powerless to establish a national church, but would also be unable to interfere with existing
state establishments.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309-10 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 253 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment in-
tended to restrict exclusively the powers of the Federal Government"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 440-41 (1961); M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND Gov-
ERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 3, 172 (1965); L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 63-89 (1986); M. MALBIN, supra note 11, at
3-17; Kurland, supra note 11, at 843-44. Madison's original proposal for what eventually became
the religion clauses of the First Amendment would have prohibited both the national and state govern-
ments from violating the equal rights of conscience. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (j. Gales ed. 1834)
(June 8, 1789). Because the calls for a bill of rights had been motivated almost exclusively by a fear of
the power of the new national government, however, most Congressmen thought that limitations on
state power were beyond the scope of the desired amendments. See Kurland, supra note 11, at
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poration of the establishment clause to apply to the states through the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court incorporated the
establishment clause with. a single paragraph of discussion in Everson,5
citing only its decisions in Cantwell v. Connecticut26 and Watson v.
Jones."7 Obviously, a provision designed primarily to protect the states
from federal interference does not incorporate well as a limitation upon
state power.2 8 What, then, remains of the establishment clause after it is
interpreted to apply as a limitation against the states?
The Supreme Court's answer has been "Quite a bit."' 29 The Court has
extended the establishment clause beyond the protection of religious lib-
erty provided by the free exercise clause. Downplaying the religious lib-
erty component of the establishment clause, the Court has suggested that
violations of that clause do not require the presence of religious coercion."0
Instead, the Lemon test considers other factors, leading the Court to strike
down government actions that are motivated primarily by a religious pur-
pose," whose primary effect is to advance religion, 2 or that create a risk
of "excessive entanglement" between church and state.33 The Court's de-
pendence upon its historical definition of the establishment clause has dis-
couraged it from undertaking a thorough analysis of the various interests
857-58. Moreover, most state constitutions in 1789 contained some guarantee of religious liberty. See
B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 87-89 (1977).
25. 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
26. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment).
27. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 730 (1871) (free exercise and establishment clauses interrelated).
28. Abington, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("it is not without irony that a constitu-
tional provision evidently designed to leave the States free to go their own way should now have
become a restriction upon their autonomy."). In this respect, incorporating the establishment clause
makes about as much sense as incorporating other federalism provisions of the bill of rights, such as
the Ninth or Tenth Amendments. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 317 & n.38.
29. Some commentators have answered: "Nothing." That is, the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment cannot incorporate the establishment clause because it is not a Bill of Rights
provision that explicitly protects individual liberties. See, e.g., E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF
POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951) ("So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned,
States are entirely free to establish religions, provided they do not deprive anybody of religious lib-
erty."). One answer to this contention "is that it underestimates the role of the Establishment Clause
as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious liberty. The Framers did not entrust the
liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone." Abington, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). Although incorporation in general, and incorporation of the establishment clause in particular,
have been the objects of criticism, there can be little doubt that incorporation of the establishment
clause is afait accompli, regardless of its historical verity. Abington, 374 U.S. at 217 ("Such conten-
tions [that incorporation of the establishment clause is incorrect], in the light of the consistent inter-
pretation in cases of this court, seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic exercises.");
Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 11 (1978).
30. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating statute requiring "balanced
treatment" in public school science classes of evolutionism and "creation science"). The Court's hold-
ing was premised on its finding that the statute's primary purpose was religious. See id. at 594.
32. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (municipal provision of
secular classes in religious schools impermissibly advances religion).
33. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (mechanisms for ensuring that federal finan-
cial aid to provide remedial education in nonpublic schools does not advance religion create excessive
entanglement of state in religious affairs).
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(particularly individual religious liberty interests) involved in these
cases."' Moreover, in applying the clause to the states, the Court has en-
larged its scope to invalidate government activities that were not found
unconstitutional at the federal level before incorporation."
The historical evidence, however, suggests that, federal-state issues
aside, the primary concern of the establishment clause is the protection of
religious liberty. 6 Many commentators who have addressed this situation
have suggested that the two clauses should be read as complementary."
Although the specific content of these suggestions has varied, the history
and text support reading both clauses as concerned with the protection of
religious liberty. Some proponents of this interpretation suggest that, con-
trary to Supreme Court dicta in Engel v. Vitale"8 and Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp,39 coercion of religious belief, choice, or exercise is the
essence of an establishment clause violation, as it is of a free exercise
clause infraction.4 This position avoids creating tension between the two
34. Cf Nowak, Due Process Methodology in the Post-Incorporation World, 70 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 397, 400-01 (1979) (arguing that attempts to base all criminal procedure decisions on
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights tend to rely on definitional analysis and therefore fail to
explore the interests at stake).
35. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 323. Professor Howe has noted that, ironically, the difficulties in
interpreting the establishment clause (particularly the tension with free exercise) following Everson
are the result of a departure from precedent. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the
first case incorporating the religion clauses, the Court interpreted the establishment clause as:
something far less radical than a banning of all forms of aid to religion. The prohibition was
read merely as a ban on a particular species of infringement of religious liberty. Given that
restrictive meaning, there were, of course, no logical difficulties in the Court's assumption that
the liberties secured by the Fourteenth Amendment included each variety of religious liberty.
M. HOWE, supra note 24, at 108.
36. From the American Revolution until the ratification of the First Amendment, arguments in
favor of limiting the powers of the state or national governments regarding religious establishments
were generally phrased in terms of religious liberty. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH
AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146, 210-17 (1986). Indeed,
the entire argument of James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
is concerned with the negative impact of Virginia's General Assessment bill on religious liberty.
Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (circa June 20, 1785), re-
printed in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 298, 300 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973)
[hereinafter Madison, Remonstrance].
37. E.g., M. HowE, supra note 24, at 108; L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 122
(1953); Choper, supra note 21, at 677; Dunsford, The Establishment Syndrome and Religious Lib-
erty, 2 DuQ. L. REV. 139, 203-12 (1953); McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81
Nw. U.L. REV. 146, 148-49 (1986); Moore, The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the
"Establishment" and "Free Exercise" Clauses, 42 TEx. L.REv. 142, 196 (1963); Paulsen, supra
note 3; see also Abington, 374 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the Framers . . .were not
content to rest the protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause."). Cf Kurland, Of
Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1961) (establishment and free
exercise clauses, in conjunction, prohibit classification in terms of religion, either to confer benefit or
to impose burden).
38. 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) ("The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not.").
39. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) ("The distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation
of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need
not be so attended.").
40. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 3, at 934-37; Paulsen, supra note 3, at 313.
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clauses, but recognizing that the principal objective of the establishment
clause is the protection of religious liberty does not explain how the clause
operates to protect the freedom of religious choice.
II. A FREE EXERCISE-CLASS ACTION APPROACH
A. Adjudicating A Free Exercise Class Suit
The Supreme Court has established a two-step test to determine when
a free exercise exemption" should be granted. First, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the challenged governmental conduct burdens a sin-
cerely-held religious belief."2 Once a plaintiff has satisfied this require-
ment, the government must demonstrate that its rule is the least restrictive
means to achieve a compelling state end.' If the state fails to carry this
burden, the plaintiff receives an exemption."
The fundamental premise of modern free exercise jurisprudence is that
the state may only coerce an individual's religious exercise when its ac-
tions are "essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest."' 5
In the context of the activist regulatory state, this not only means that the
government may not prohibit religious conduct, but also that it may not
deny an otherwise available benefit on the basis of religion.'
The Supreme Court has at times recognized that a similar concern un-
derlay the-framing of the establishment clause. In Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, the first case applying the religion clauses to the states, the Court
stated that the establishment clause was intended primarily to protect reli-
gious liberty by "forestall[ing] compulsion by law of the acceptance of any
creed or the practice of any form of worship.' 7 The Court has also made
reference to this element of compulsion in several establishment clause
cases."' But despite the Court's occasional recognition of the historical
centrality of religious coercion to both clauses,' 9 the Lemon test does not
41. An exemption excuses a claimant from the requirements of the challenged (facially neutral)
law that burdens religious freedom. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (exemption
from state eligibility rule for unemployment benefits for person whose resignation was mandated by
religious beliefs).
42. Although the truth of a belief may not be examined, it must be "truly held." United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
43. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718. This inquiry focuses upon the state's interest in denying an exemp-
tion, not the interest in maintaining the underlying rule for unexceptional cases. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-10, at 855 (1st ed. 1978).
44. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1983); Thomas, 450 U.S. 707; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
45. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58.
46. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18. This approach was initially employed in Sherbert, 374 U.S. at
398.
47. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
48. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 451-52 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
309-12 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 314 (1948); see also McConnell, Coer-
cion, supra note 3, at 934-35.
49. "[Tihe Court has identified the individual's freedom of conscience as the central liberty that
unifies the various clauses in the First Amendment." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985); see
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explicitly consider such coercion. 50 A free exercise-class action approach to
the establishment clause would focus precisely upon this issue.51
B. A Taxonomy of Coercion
The attempt to define the establishment clause in terms of coercion is
complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court's views of coercion under
the two religion clauses have not been symmetrical. Despite the Court's
contention that establishment clause violations do not necessarily involve
coercion of religious choice, 2 more than once it has noted the presence of
religious coercion in striking down a practice under that clause.53 The
failure to identify coercion as the central element of establishment has pre-
vented the Court from analyzing how various types of conduct challenged
under the establishment clause act to coerce religious choice.
1. Coerced Religious Practices
At the heart of the religious liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment
is the protection from being required to act contrary to one's religious
convictions. Governmental compulsion of religiously objectionable conduct
and prohibition of religiously motivated conduct were the primary evils
with which the framers of the religion clauses were concerned.5" Modern
variations of this type of compulsion include a state requirement that li-
cense plates display the motto "Live Free or Die" applied to a religious
McConnell, Coercion, supra note 3.
50. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
51. A free exercise suit may be brought as a class action in federal court under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In order to be maintained as a class action, a
suit must first satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a): (1) the class is too numerous for practica-
blejoinder of all members; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims of
the representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representatives will adequately
protect the interests of the class. Most establishment clause cases brought as free exercise class suits
would satisfy these requirements.
Free exercise claims for class relief are rarely made because such claims would expose the basic
weakness of free exercise exemptions: the impact that exemptions to all those similarly situated to the
plaintiff would have on the challenged rule. Such a suit ceases to be a request for an individual
exemption and becomes an attack on the regulation itself. Cf Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy, J., concurring), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1029 (1988) (noting negative impact on public school reading curriculum of allowing widespread
exemptions); Wilder v. Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (free exercise challenge to Cath-
olic foster care agency regulations prohibiting birth control information).
52. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430; Abington, 374 U.S. at 223.
53. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 429-30; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947).
54. For example, in colonial Virginia, preaching or holding a religious meeting other than as
prescribed by Anglican liturgy and practice was punishable by criminal sanctions. See L. LEVY, supra
note 24, at 1-5; Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), reprinted in 1
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104, 106 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1973). The legislative
history behind the drafting of the First Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to
prohibit the federal government both from prohibiting such religious exercises and from compelling
any form of religious observance. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 730-31 (J. Gales ed. 1834) (Aug. 15,
1789); Kurland, supra note 11.
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objector,5" a mandatory religious oath as a prerequisite to holding a state
office,5 or the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance as a condition of
attendance at public school.5  These forms of coercion are traditionally
and invariably cognizable under the free exercise clause. 8
2. Inequality of Benefits
In the twentieth century, the Court has recognized that coercion may
take more subtle forms, particularly in the modern welfare state.5 9
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon con-
duct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit
because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting sub-
stantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to vio-
late his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial.6"
Where one entity receives a public benefit while another similarly situated
does not, religious coercion is again present. In essence, the state is engag-
ing in a form of bribery or blackmail by creating strong incentives in favor
of one form of religious exercise and against another through its distribu-
tion of welfare entitlements."1
These forms of coercion are the subject of litigation under both religion
clauses.6" It is in this area that the two clauses most often seem to collide.
This collision, which is most apparent when the Court is reviewing a
governmental effort to accommodate religion, may be the inevitable result
of the Lemon test's failure to focus upon coercion."3 The practical difficul-
55. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
56. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
57. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
58. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
59. "The rise of the welfare state was not the fall of the Free Exercise Clause." Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
60. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981). This approach was initially employed
in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
61. See, e.g, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas, 450 U.S.
707; Sherbert, 374 U. S. 398; cf Madison, Remonstrance, supra note 36, at 300 ("As the [General
Assessment] Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens, so it violates the same prin-
ciple, by granting to others peculiar exemptions.").
A similar concern for the influence of unequal treatment compromising religious choice at the
hands of the law underlies the Supreme Court's decision in Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 288 (1982).
Larson is significant because it was an establishment clause case in which the Court did not apply the
Lemon test, but rather used a strict scrutiny test similar to the test employed under the free exercise
clause. The Court found that a state charitable solicitations act, which exempted from reporting re-
quirements only religious organizations obtaining more than fifty percent of their total contributions
from members or affiliated organizations, discriminated among religions, and was not the least bur-
densome means of achieving a compelling state interest.
62. See, e.g., Larson, 456 U.S. 288 (establishment clause); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (free exercise clause).
63. See generally McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3.
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ties of distinguishing government efforts to accommodate religious beliefs
from governmental attempts to advance religious positions lead inexorably
to this conflict.6 '
3. Threat of Stigmatization
The Court has also recognized the stigma that might be suffered by
individuals forced to "opt out" 5 openly from a public religious practice or
activity.66 The Court has noted such stigmatization in striking down state-
sponsored religious practices that provide for excusing or exempting dis-
senters"7 (particularly dissenting public schoolchildren6 8 ). Stigmatization
is essentially a weaker form of governmental compulsion, where the gov-
ernment creates social pressures that lead individuals to undertake conduct
that the state could not (and may not intend to) compel directly.
Despite recognizing the coercive threat of stigmatization in the estab-
lishment clause context, 9 the Court has failed to note any such danger in
free exercise cases. Indeed, the option of being excused from participation
in an objectionable practice, which raises the specter of stigmatization in
establishment clause cases, is the very mechanism usually employed as a
remedy under the free exercise clause. 0 This is significant because the
coercive impact of stigmatization upon individuals does not vary depend-
ing upon whether the public practice from which exemption is sought is
labelled "religious," as seems to be the implicit premise supporting the
Court's differing approaches under the two clauses.
4. Government Endorsement
A fourth form of coercion of religious choice might arise from the state
endorsing particular religious beliefs, symbols, or practices. The Court has
64. The government has ample room to accommodate religious practices, Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970), but, at some point, accommodation may devolve into unlawful fostering of
religion, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987).
65. Opt-out provisions may be part of the challenged practice, see, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 438-39 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring), or may be available only as a judicially-imposed rem-
edy following a lawsuit, see, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
66. See, e.g.,Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (state statute requiring moment of silence at beginning of school
day, with specific provision for "voluntary prayer"); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (state statute requiring reading of Biblical passages at beginning of school day); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-sponsored teacher-led prayer in public school classrooms). The
form of the opt-out provision can determine the degree of threat of stigmatization. See Abington, 374
U.S. at 318 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., Engel, 370 U.S. at 431; Abington, 374 U.S. at 288-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
68. The Court has expressed concern that school children, especially elementary school children,
are a peculiarly captive and impressionable audience, in ways that adults are not. See Abington, 374
U.S. at 296-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
69. See, e.g., Abington, 374 U.S. at 208 n.3 (testimony of plaintiff Schempp) (reluctance of stu-
dent to exercise excusal prerogative for fear of stigmatization).
70. The Barnette Court did not even consider the possible stigmatization that Jehovah's Witnesses
schoolchildren might suffer for refusing to participate in the Pledge of Allegiance at the height of
World War II. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
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observed that "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of govern-
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially
approved religion is plain."' " This coercive impact has been noted most
extensively by Justice O'Connor in promulgating her "endorsement test"
as a "clarification" of the Court's Lemon test for establishment clause
violations. 2
The Court and Justice O'Connor are certainly correct that a clear gov-
ernment endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint may subtly co-
erce religious choices.7 Justice O'Connor's analysis paraphrases the
Court's Lemon test to ask whether a government action has as either its
purpose or effect communication of a message of endorsement. 4 The diffi-
culty in endorsement analysis, however, is determining what constitutes a
coercive endorsement. Whose perceptions of endorsement count? Recog-
nizing the problems inherent in simply adopting the point of view of the
government or of a majority of citizens,75 Justice O'Connor posits a hypo-
thetical "objective observer," familiar not only with the context of the par-
ticular litigative dispute, but also with the historical and doctrinal founda-
tions of the First Amendment.7"
Justice O'Connor's test is unsatisfactory for a First Amendment analy-
sis based upon coercion. Her reliance upon the objective observer begs the
question of what constitutes an endorsement of religion, because she fails
to provide standards to guide her observer (or anyone else). 7 One person's
"permissible accommodation" is often another's "unconstitutional endorse-
ment."'78  Is this observer, familiar with the background of the First
Amendment, a "strict separationist" or a "nonpreferentialist"?
Strangely, Justice O'Connor, as objective observer, has found that a stat-
71. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). Despite thus acknowledging the coercion implicit
under a New York statute that required teachers to lead vocal classroom prayers composed by the
state, the Court implied that such coercion was irrelevant to its holding that the prayers were a state-
sponsored religious activity in violation of the establishment clause. Id. at 431-33.
72. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
73. The Court has suggested that the relevant inquiry should be "whether the symbolic union of
church and state effected by the challenged governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disap-
proval, of their individual religious choices." Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985).
74. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75. See Smith, Syvnbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
"No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 267, 283-99 (1987).
76. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76. In announcing her endorsement test in Lynch, Justice O'Connor
initially suggested that the actual perceptions of real citizens would be decisive. 465 U.S. at 690
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. See Smith, supra note 75, at 292-93.
78. Compare Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (statute allowing employees of private business to elect not to work on own "Sabbath"
impermissibly endorses religion) with McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3, at 50-58 (statute
struck down in Caldor was a permissible accommodation of the free exercise of religion).
79. McConnell, Accommodation, supra note 3, at 48; see also Marshall, supra note 23, at 537.
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ute providing for a classroom "moment of silence for meditation or volun-
tary prayer" is an unconstitutional endorsement,"0 while a municipally-
funded public display of a Christmas nativity scene is not.,'
If the purpose of the endorsement test is to prevent the government
from causing citizens to believe that they are political "outsiders" due to
their religious beliefs, as Justice O'Connor would have it, 2 or, similarly,
to prevent citizens from being coerced in their religious choices by the
government placing its imprimatur upon certain religious positions, then
the relevant perspective for determining endorsement should be the actual
perceptions of real citizens. 3 The intent of the government should be im-
portant only to the extent that it influences the manner in which govern-
ment action is actually perceived by citizens. Therefore, evidence of an
intent to endorse religion might serve as a trigger for a more searching
inquiry into the actual effects of government acts, rather than as an inde-
pendent test of constitutionality. 4
However, to invalidate a government action on the ground that a mi-
nority of citizens think it endorses a particular religious position would
paralyze the government in many areas. In as pluralistic a society as mod-
ern America, many apparently neutral state actions may strike some ob-
servers as endorsements of religion. 5 By recognizing the perceptions of
any citizen, the test would risk invalidating practices that are neither in-
tended to endorse nor generally perceived as endorsing religion, but are
misperceived as endorsements of religion by a few people.
This problem of governmental paralysis, however, exists only if the sole
remedy available to a court is to enjoin the government activity. But if the
remedy is narrowly tailored to removing whatever coercive pressure is cre-
ated, invalidating the entire government activity will not always be neces-
80. Jaffree, 472 U.s. at 67-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor found that the cr&he was not religious.
82. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88.
83. See Smith, supra note 75, at 294-95.
84. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 612-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf Paulsen,
supra note 3, at 339-45 (suggesting Lemon test should be revised so purpose prong acts as "trigger"
for equal protection strict scrutiny).
For example, if a state legislature proclaimed Presbyterianism the official state religion, the mes-
sage of approval sent to adherents, and of disapproval sent to nonadherents, not to mention the mes-
sage sent to those deciding whether to adhere, certainly tilts the scales of religious choice. But not all
such questions are so simple. Are executive proclamations of days of voluntary prayer coercive? Cf
Madison, Detached Memoranda, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 89, 93 (R.
Alley ed. 1985) (criticizing proclamation of days of prayer, unless such days are clearly designated as
voluntary). Are government efforts to acknowledge the place of religion in American society, such as
printing "In God We Trust" on federal currency, or proclaiming "God Save This Honourable
Court" at the commencement of judicial proceedings, coercive endorsements of religion? See, e.g.,
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676-77 (citing "In God We Trust" as example of government acknowledgement,
not endorsement, of religion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (use of "In God We Trust" is "interwoven . . . so deeply into the fabric of our civil
polity" that it is not an unconstitutional endorsement of religion).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting claim that United
States military policy establishes "religion of nuclearism").
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sary, and the problem of paralysis will be reduced. In this manner, the
objectives of both Justice O'Connor's test and of a coercion-oriented anal-
ysis may be achieved."6 If the governmental "message" is ambiguous, a
disclaimer may provide a sufficient remedy. Thus, a clearly visible dis-
claimer of religious intent might remedy the risk of endorsement engen-
dered by a crtche displayed on public property. 7 An insincere or ineffec-
tive disclaimer, such as declaring that a proclamation of Presbyterianism
as the official state religion is not intended to constitute an endorsement of
that religion, would be an inadequate remedy.
5. Taxpayer Compulsion
The most indirect form of coercion recognized by the Supreme Court is
compulsory taxpayer support of religion. The Court stated in Everson
that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion."88 In Flast v.
Cohen, the Court went further to conclude that a taxpayer qua taxpayer
has standing to sue under the establishment clause, reading the clause's
history to suggest "that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if
government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid one reli-
gion over another or to aid religion in general."89 The Supreme Court has
not explicitly stated, however, that such taxing and spending directly co-
erces taxpayers. The Court has spoken less of the receipt of tax monies by
religious entities as an infringement of religious liberty than of a constitu-
tional right created by the establishment clause not to have one's tax dol-
lars distributed to religious entities.90
The fundamental flaw in the taxpayer compulsion argument results
from the failure of the Supreme Court to recognize the differences be-
tween the exercise of the taxing and spending power in the eighteenth and
in the twentieth centuries. The Court has drawn its arguments about tax-
payer standing and establishment clause rights of taxpayers almost en-
tirely from the "three-pence" argument of James Madison's famous Me-
86. Indeed, as Professor Smith has suggested, Justice O'Connor's "argument suggests that it is
really coercion or unwilling indoctrination that should be the touchstone of constitutionality." Smith,
supra note 75, at 304-05 n.147.
87. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Kentu.eky v. Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.
Ky. 1988) (requiring visible disclaimer on, and equal access by other religious groups to, manger
displayed during Christmas season on grounds of state capitol). The fact that such public property is
treated as a "public forum" open to other citizen displays on a content-neutral basis underlines the
veracity of the disclaimer. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text.
88. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
89. 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring);
id. at 115 (Fortas, J., concurring).
90. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 103-04; id. at 114 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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morial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,91 offering little
justification for its position apart from this history.9" In employing the
Remonstrance to determine the twentieth-century meaning of the estab-
lishment clause, the Supreme Court has failed to recognize the crucial
differences between eighteenth-century Virginia and the modern welfare
state. In the eighteenth century, there were no broad programs of public
aid carried on by extensive government bureaucracies and financed by tax
revenues collected from the incomes of the citizens at large. Nor was there
a conception of such aid as entitlements akin to property rights, of which
recipients could not be deprived without due process of law.9" To apply
Madison's arguments about compulsory contributions to religious institu-
tions in an era of very limited government to today's decisions regarding
the distribution of government aid is to "fail[] to come to grips with the
depths of Madison's fundamental premises." 94
A further difficulty with the taxpayer compulsion argument lies in its
failure to make clear the manner in which the dissemination to religious
entities of money drawn from tax revenues influences the religious choices
of taxpayers. Whether such aid is distributed in no way alters a tax-
payer's tax obligations.9" Since the outcome of any case brought by such a
taxpayer in no way changes her tax status, the existence or nonexistence
of such expenditures cannot influence the religious choices of such a per-
son as a taxpayer.
The taxpayer compulsion argument fails to distinguish satisfactorily be-
tween government taxing and government spending as sources of coer-
91.
Who does not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclu-
sion of all other Sects? that the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three
pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
Madison, Remonstrance, supra note 36, at 300.
92. The taxpayer compulsion argument presented in Flast v. Cohen was premised entirely upon
the "three pence" argument of the Remonstrance. 392 U.S. at 103-05. The Remonstrance, as con-
strued in Everson, 330 U.S at 12-16, strongly influenced the taxpayer compulsion arguments ad-
vanced in McCullom, 333 U.S. 203, 209-12 (1948), and in Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32 & nn.13-16.
93. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
94. Paulsen, supra note 3, at 335 n.110.
95. Justice Harlan made this point in his dissent in Flast:
If this case involved a tax specifically designed for the support of religion, as was the Virginia
tax opposed by Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance, I would agree that taxpayers
have rights under the religious clauses of the First Amendment that would permit them stand-
ing to challenge the tax's validity in the federal courts. But this is not such a case, and appel-
lants challenge an expenditure, not a tax. Where no such tax is involved, a taxpayer's com-
plaint can consist only of an allegation that public funds have been, or shortly will be,
expended for purposes inconsistent with the Constitution. The taxpayer cannot ask the return
of any portion of his previous tax payments, cannot prevent the collection of any existing tax
debt, and cannot demand an adjudication of the propriety of any particular level of taxation.
His tax payments are received for the general purposes of the United States, and are, upon
proper receipt, lost in the general revenues.
392 U.S. 83, 128 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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cion; it incorrectly conflates two accurate concerns about religious coercion
to create a new conception of compulsion, and then applies this new con-
cept in contexts to which neither of its parts applies.9 There can be little
doubt that a direct tax levied on a religious activity9 7 or levied explicitly to
compel religious exercise98 operates to coerce individual choices regarding
religion. But these forms of taxation are quite different from a general
income tax.
It makes no sense to treat the disbursement of federal funds to religious
institutions or individuals as any more coercive to taxpayers than other
expenditures of tax monies that taxpayers, for religious or nonreligious
reasons, may find objectionable. This is not to say that government taxing
or spending cannot coerce religious choice, but such coercion-where it
exists-should be analyzed as either a coercive tax on a particular class of
persons,99 or an unequal distribution of public benefits on the basis of the
recipients' or nonrecipients' exercise or nonexercise of religion.'
C. The Class Action Component
The establishment clause protects diffuse, widespread, and individually
minimal interests in much the same way that the modern class action de-
vice aggregates diffuse and individually minimal interests in, for example,
a consumer class action against a business enterprise.' This is not to
suggest that the framers self-consciously intended the establishment clause
to create a provision analogous to a free exercise case brought as a modern
class action; they could not have done so, for the concept of group litiga-
tion had not yet appeared in American legal thought.
The First Amendment was framed prior to the "industrialization of
group litigation" in the nineteenth century.'0 2 At that time, the English
common law of class actions reflected a different world from that of the
modern class action. From its medieval origins through the eighteenth
century, group litigation was a creation of equity that merely facilitated
96. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the problem of taxpayer compulsion in the free
exercise context. In the most analogous case, the Court rejected a free exercise challenge by an Amish
employer seeking an exemption from social security taxes that violated his religious beliefs. The Court
assumed arguendo that the payment of such taxes did burden the free exercise of the plaintiff's reli-
gion, and found the state interest in maintaining a sound tax system to be so compelling as to justify
such a burden. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982).
97. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
98. This was the harm of revolutionary Virginia's general assessment bill against which
Madison's Remonstrance was directed. The assessment bill, which would have allowed the taxpayer
to specify to which denomination he wished to have his contribution go, was in effect a compelled
tithe. See T. CURRY, supra note 36, at 140-41. Had there been no disbursement of the taxpayer's
"three pence" to the religious teacher of his choice, the taxpayer would not have paid this "three
pence" at all.
99. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
100. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964 (1971).
102. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part I: The Industrialization of Group
Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 514 (1980).
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legal action that cohesive social groups would in any case have attempted
(such as efforts by tenants to resolve disputes with lords about manorial
duties).1"' The cohesive nature of the groups involved, and the role of
courts of equity in resolving these disputes (which were primarily about
customary law), made group litigation at that time more nearly legislation
than modern litigation, with relief granted primarily prospectively rather
than retrospectively." 4 The essential concept of litigative representation of
the interests of a class of individuals not named as parties to a suit had not
yet developed.
The English common law of group litigation did not appear in the
United States legal system until the 1820's, when Justice Joseph Story
invoked English group litigation precedents in several opinions and in his
two equity treatises." 5 The concept of the class action underwent a slow
and tortuous evolution in America until its flowering in the mid-twentieth
century.'08 Obviously, if the concept of group representative litigation was
not remotely evident in American law until 1820, it is unlikely to have
influenced the framers of the establishment clause. To the extent that the
establishment clause is concerned with the protection of religious liberty
and not with federalism issues, it embodies the Framers' intuitive notions
about the ways in which government can subtly infringe religious liberty
by placing diffuse burdens upon the free exercise of religion.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF A FREE EXERCISE-CLASS ACTION APPROACH
The possibility that the establishment clause exists to aggregate wide-
spread minimal injuries to religious liberty suggests that several concep-
tual elements of existing establishment clause jurisprudence might also be
reexamined.
A. Standing to Sue
A taxpayer as taxpayer generally does not have standing to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional government conduct.' 7 To have standing, a
plaintiff must have suffered actual injury as a result of the defendant's
conduct, as distinct from injury to an interest shared by plaintiff and a
substantial portion of the public at large.'08 In Flast v. Cohen,10 the Su-
103. Id. at 516-19.
104. See Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 866, 876-74 (1977) [hereinafter Yeazell, Social Context]; Yeazell, From Group
Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067
(1980).
105. See S. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
214-19 (1987).
106. Id. at 220-37.
107. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
108. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975). In a class action suit, the named plaintiff
must satisfy the requirements of individual standing. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
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preme Court created an exception to this rule. The Court permitted a
taxpayer to sue the government for violations of the establishment clause
upon showing, first, that the government activity was an exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power of Article I of the Constitution,
and, second, that the challenged enactment exceeded specific constitutional
limitations on the exercise of the taxing and spending power, rather than
merely exceeding the powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution."'
The Flast exception was justified on the basis of the establishment
clause's assertedly unique history, which the Court interpreted as demon-
strating that the clause is a specific limitation on the taxing and spending
power."' The unique status of the Flast exception is demonstrated by the
Court's unwillingness to expand the exception to cover other types of con-
stitutional violations."'
The Court in Flast sought to afford remedies for diffuse injuries to
religious liberty. It could have seized upon the concept of a class action in
free exercise/establishment clause cases; taxpayer standing is a poor proxy
for what is actually at stake. A free exercise-class action analogy acknowl-
edges that establishment clause violations involve actual injury, yet main-
tains continuity with general standing doctrine. The test for determining
standing should not be the nexus between taxpayer status and specific
constitutional limitations on congressional spending enunciated in Flast;
rather, it should be the usual determination of whether plaintiff has suf-
fered an injury as a result of defendant's conduct such that granting relief
will remedy plaintiff's injury."' The injury is to an individual's religious
liberty, a personal stake often undervalued because it is diffuse, inchoate,
and non-economic." 4 When a plaintiff can allege injury to her religious
liberty interests, she should have standing.'" Since "[o]rdinarily, one may
not claim standing . . . to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third
426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976); Huddleston v. Duckworth, 97 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
109. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
110. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03.
111. Id. at 88-100. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (rejecting citizen and taxpayer standing to mount establishment clause
challenge to administrative action under Article IV, § 3 of Constitution); Schlesinger v. Reservists'
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (rejecting citizen and taxpayer standing under
Article I, § 6 of Constitution); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (rejecting citizen and
taxpayer standing under Article I, § 9 of Constitution).
113. See, e.g., Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1007 (D. Mass. 1979) (collecting cases). Cf.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (free
exercise claims of parents in Zorach, McCollum, and Schempp were sufficient allegations of injury to
religious liberty to confer standing).
114. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 429-430 (1961) (standing to challenge state ac-
tion under establishment clause does not require proof that particular religious freedoms are
infringed).
115. Such an injury must be felt directly by the plaintiff. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734-40 (1972).
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party,"116 in cases in which the plaintiff was unable to allege such per-
sonal injury there should be no standing.
B. Remedial Possibilities
Because the paradigmatic modern free exercise suit is ordinarily
brought by a plaintiff claiming that a facially neutral rule burdens the
free exercise of her religion,11 the standard remedy is to grant the plain-
tiff an individual exemption from the requirement. 1 For a violation of
the establishment clause, on the other hand, the customary relief is to en-
join the offending government conduct.1 9 These remedies are not explic-
itly required by these clauses; rather, they are functional responses to the
harms to be remedied. Free exercise clause plaintiffs have occasionally
sought money damages;1"' similarly, if a law on its face prohibits the free
exercise of religion, or applies only to persons who would be entitled to an
exemption, the entire law may be invalidated on free exercise grounds. 21
This range of potential free exercise clause remedies suggests that courts
should enjoy a degree of remedial flexibility unavailable under current
establishment clause doctrine.
The remedial starting point should be that employed under the free
exercise clause: granting individual exemptions to all those within the
class represented by an objecting plaintiff. In some instances, though, an
exemption, however widespread, will be insufficient. Exercising the option
to opt out may stigmatize dissenters, unless the alternatives available upon
excusal are reasonably attractive. 22 Moreover, an exemption is often an
inappropriate remedy for government endorsement.1 23 In such cases, other
116. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953); accord Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114
(1976).
117. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (free exercise
challenge to denial of unemployment benefits); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (free exercise
challenge to requiring provision of social security number as condition of receiving government bene-
fits); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (free exercise challenge to unemployment commis-
sion's determination that dismissal for refusal to engage in conduct objectionable to religious beliefs
does not constitute "good cause").
118. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 720.
119. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating law providing for moment of
silence for voluntary prayer or mediation at start of public school day); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) (enjoining program of religious instruction on public school premises); see also
Smith, supra note 23, at 298 n.126.
120. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(rejecting free exercise suit for monetary damages and exemption from use of public school textbooks
considered religiously objectionable).
121. See, e.g, McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (law disqualifying ministers from serving as
delegates to state constitutional convention violates free exercise clause; entire law held invalid).
122. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that all opt-out provi-
sions necessarily result in such stigmatization. If attractive alternatives to participation are available,
the threat of stigmatization should be largely obviated. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 318 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
123. For example, it is not possible for a citizen to opt out of a nativity scene or a proclamation of
an official state religion.
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forms of relief are appropriate. If less drastic remedies are insufficient to
rectify the harm, a court should enjoin the challenged conduct. 124
Cases involving the distribution of public benefits to religious entities
offer a further remedial option.' 25 In such cases, the failure to confer the
benefit in question upon a similarly situated individual or organization on
the basis of religion would constitute a burden on free exercise. 2 6 In the-
ory, the entities involved would be "exempted" from the religious require-
ments for the aid. In practice, a court might employ a "second-look" doc-
trine127 to neutralize such "coercion through discrimination" by requiring
that the benefit payment include all those improperly excluded, while
leaving the legislature the option of discontinuing the entire program. 2 '
A residual form of coercion is that engendered by government endorse-
ment of a particular religious position. Cases involving religious expres-
sion by the state, such as the presentation of religious symbols, rituals, or
activities on government property or in government activities, most fre-
quently raise the specter of endorsement. 29 In such cases, two remedial
124. In certain instances, an opt-out solution will be inappropriate. On the one hand, the state's
interest in the challenged activity may be so compelling that to grant an exemption would substan-
tially undermine the state interest. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (denying
Amish request for religious exemption from social security tax system). On the other hand, the state
action may be such that continuing it while permitting persons to opt out would not eliminate reli-
gious coercion. Such was probably the case in Engel v. Vitale: a state-composed prayer can hardly fail
to constitute an endorsement of religion. 370 U.S. 421, 425, 430-31 (1962) (enjoining recitation of
prayer at start of public school day). In such a case, the state action should be enjoined.
125. Despite the abundance of such cases, no clear principle for distinguishing permissible from
impermissible aid has emerged from the Court's opinions. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,
108-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Justices themselves have shown great disagree-
ment on the subject. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (six separate opinions filed).
126. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 3. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
127. Cf. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (invalidating law under equal protection clause, unlike other provisions, "does not disable any
governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand"); G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR
THE AGE OF STATUTES (1983) (suggesting courts should employ "second-look" doctrines to force
legislatures to reconsider obsolescent statutes).
128. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). Such an outcome is similar to that in
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), a hybrid free exercise-free speech case in which the Court
ruled that a public university that allowed organized student groups use of university facilities for
their activities could not deny such use to a student religious group simply because the group was
religious. The university could either allow the religious group to use the facilities on the same basis
and under the same conditions as other student groups or not allow access to any student groups.
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1984), provides an example of a recent case in which this ap-
proach would have altered the outcome. In Aguilar, the Supreme Court upheld a taxpayer challenge
to the use of federal funds to pay public employees teaching remedial skills to educationally-deprived
children in parochial schools, finding that the mechanisms designed to ensure that the public school
employees would not advance the schools' religious mission had created "excessive entanglement" be-
tween church and state. Since the remedial education program applied to non-parochial private
schools as well as to parochial schools, and since similar remedial education was available in the
public schools, supporting such remedial aid in parochial schools could not coerce or alter religious
choices of students or parents. Thus, the aid should have been constitutionally permissible. See 473
U.S. at 430-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. In two such cases the Supreme Court has shown reluctance to apply its Lemon test. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding public creche display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding religious invocation in state legislature, on basis of use of legislative
invocation in first Congress).
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1739
concerns should be addressed. First, a court should remedy the coercive
pressure created by unequal distribution of the symbolic benefit conferred
by the government expression by requiring that equal access be provided
to those previously excluded.' Since equal access may in some instances
be practically impossible, the expression might be enjoined in such cases.
Second, a court should carefully investigate whether a government action
places the state's imprimatur upon a particular religious position. 3' If so,
a court should require an official disclaimer of intent to endorse. If
nonadherents of the allegedly endorsed religious position have equal access
to the state's expressive medium as adherents do, a disclaimer should be a
sufficient remedy."3 2
If the crux of an establishment clause violation is state interference with
religious liberty, 33 then relief from such wrongs should restore that lib-
erty to the injured parties. The appropriate remedies should be: (1) re-
moving any government compulsion by making the compelled conduct
strictly voluntary, and creating a non-stigmatizing opt-out mechanism for
conscientious objectors; (2) neutralizing coercion through discrimination
by extending the right or benefit in question to the disfavored class, on
equivalent terms; or (3) eliminating coercion through endorsement by re-
quiring a sincere and effective official disclaimer of intent to endorse and
by providing equal access to the government expressive medium on a non-
religious basis. If such measures are inadequate to remedy the harm to
religious liberty, a court should enjoin the entire program or activity.' 3'
130. Such a remedy corresponds to the Supreme Court's general approach to cases involving pri-
vate expressive use of public property, usually referred to as "public forum doctrine." See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
In fact, this is precisely what the Second Circuit did in resolving an establishment clause challenge
to a creche display, relying upon public forum doctrine to justify its remedy. McCreary v. Stone, 739
F.2d 716, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1984), affd mem. by equally divided Court sub nom. Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 471 U.S. 1849 (1985) (public forum doctrine requires equal access to creche site).
131. See supra notes 71-87 and accompanying text.
132. Although such government expression may be permissible as a matter of constitutional law,
affording truly equal access on neutral terms to the many diverse religious perspectives existing in
modem American society may be so difficult as to be for all practical purposes impossible.
133. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text. This Note assumes that the decision not to
exercise a religion is simply a special case of the free exercise of religion protected by the First
Amendment. See Paulsen, supra note 3, at 337-38 n.116. But cf Freeman, The Misguided Search for
the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEo. L.J. 1519, 1522 (1983) ("What the free exer-
cise clause protects is the free exercise of religion, not the free exercise of conscience.").
134. Compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute violates constitutional rights of Jehovah's Witnesses students; students exempted) with Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) ("released time" program for consenting students to
receive religious instruction on public school premises, with nonparticipating students sent to study
hall, violates establishment clause; program enjoined). Both cases involved religious coercion, including
the danger of stigmatization. And in both, the state was found to be acting beyond its legitimate
authority. Yet the Supreme Court enjoined the McCollum program and granted an exemption to the
Witnesses in Barnette.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Reconceptualizing establishment clause suits as free exercise class ac-
tions provides a useful analytic tool for evaluating the Supreme Court's
establishment clause jurisprudence. It focuses upon the key concern un-
derlying both the establishment and free exercise clauses: the protection of
religious liberty. But it does so with the explicit recognition that govern-
ment actions may impose subtle, difficult-to-recognize burdens upon the
religious choices of many individuals. Furthermore, this reconceptualiza-
tion offers a view of standing to sue more in line with the Court's general
standing doctrine than is the "taxpayer exception" of Flast v. Cohen.3 5
Finally, the free exercise-class action approach provides a new perspective
upon establishment clause remedial options and restores a basic symmetry
between remedies under the two religion clauses.1"8 Free exercise claims,
which are typically individual cases, systematically understate the true
costs of accommodating religious beliefs in that they do not fully consider
the effect of granting the same relief to other, similarly-situated potential
claimants.1 17 By thinking of these cases on a class, rather than atomistic,
basis courts may fashion their remedies with a more accurate appreciation
of the consequences. '3 Conversely, establishment clause claims tend to
overstate the extent of the constitutional violation and resulting harm.1"9
The class action came into being only through religious actions, as the
earliest recorded English class actions were brought to enforce the tithe
obligations of a "class" of defendant parishioners.' 40 Perhaps it is fitting
that the modern class action should afford the best analogy for under-
standing the manner in which the establishment of religion clause oper-
ates to protect religious liberty.
135. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
136. The free exercise-class action approach may also restore some of the initial federalistic orien-
tation of the establishment clause, as it permits the maximum possible degree of community self-
determination by limiting judicial intervention with the decisions of other segments of government to
the minimum necessary for the full protection of religious liberty.
137. For example, were the exception from compulsory education laws allowed in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), consistently applied, the effect upon public education would be substan-
tial. Cf. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 1987) (Kennedy,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988) (noting negative impact on public school reading
curriculum of allowing widespread exemptions).
138. Cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 524 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (govern-
ment may consider costs of allowing exemptions to all potential claimants in deciding whether to
exempt plaintiff from military headgear requirement).
139. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (federal courts
must tailor scope of judicial remedy to fit nature and extent of constitutional violation).
140. See Yeazell, Social Context, supra note 104, at 869-96.
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